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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE FIRST DECADE 
Stephen J. Friedman * 
0 N June 2 I, 1966, Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., deliv- ered the majority opinion in Schmerber v. California.* That 
opinion concluded his first decade on the Supreme Court of the 
United States, an extraordinarily fruitful decade in the evolution 
of constitutional doctrine. While it is too early to attempt a final 
assessment of his contribution to the work of the Court, this anni- 
versary provides an appropriate occasion for a review of that 
contribution. 
There has been some tendency to classify Mr. Justice Brennan 
as a judicial liberal - which he assuredly is - reflecting the ab- 
solutist views of Mr. Justice Black - which he does not. Reading 
his opinions of the last ten years, two pervading themes, one sub- 
stantive and the other functional, are particularly a~paren t .~  
First, he is deeply committed to the values of individual liberty 
as embodied in the passive "right to be let alone," which he 
views as in constant danger of being overreached by govern- 
mental action. These values are broader than the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights, and for Mr. Justice Brennan they are guide- 
posts in expanding the meaning of that list of specific guarantees. 
Second, he believes that the constitutional framework accords to 
the judiciary the primary task of protecting the integrity of the 
individual and that the procedural aspects of the judicial process 
are essential safeguards for substantive rights. These themes are 
clearly reflected in the closing passage of a speech given by Mr. 
Justice Brennan not long ago: 
*Member of the New York Bar. A.B., Princeton, 1959; LL.B., Harvard, 1962. 
Clerk to Mr. Justice Brennan, 1963 Term. 
This artide is based on the first chapter of a collection of Mr. Justice Brennan's 
opinions and speeches, edited by the author, which will be published by Atheneum 
next year. 
' 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
The limited scope of this artide precludes even a mention of many important 
opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan, e.g., those in the areas of labor law, antitrust, 
reapportionment, state libel laws and the first amendment, and the important 
opinions of last Term considering the power of Congress to define the scope of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
Brennan, Constitzrtionat Adjudication, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559, 569 (1965) 
(footnote omitted). 
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The constant for Americans, for our ancestors, for ourselves, 
and we hope for future generations, is our commitment to the con- 
stitutional ideal 'of libertarian dignity protected through law. 
Crises in prospect are creating, and will create, more and more 
threats to the achievement of that ideal - more and more colli- 
sions of the individual with his government. The need for judicial 
viglance in the service of that ideal will not lessen. It will 
remain the business of judges to 'protect fundamental constitu- 
tional rights which will be threatened in ways not possibly en- 
visaged by the Framers. Justices yet to sit, like their predecessors, 
are destined to labor earnestly in that endeavor - we hope with 
' wisdom- to reconcile the complex realities of their times with 
the principles which mark a free people. For as the nation moves 
ever forward towards its goals of liberty and freedom . . . the 
role of the Supreme Court will be ever the same - to justify Madi- 
son's faith that "independent tribunals of justice will consider 
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of [constitutional] 
'rights." 
A. "[A] BROAD RIGHT TO INVIOLATE PERSONALITY" 
Paul Freund has ,noted that "there are civil liberties which 
point to insurgency and there are those which look to integrity." 
While Mr. Justice Brennan has been by no means indifferent to 
the former: his principal substantive concern has been with the 
rights of privacy, the passive liberties broadly conceived. 
His views are seen most clearly in opinions dealing with the 
fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina- 
tion. While the language of these amendments speaks to procedur- 
al aspects of the criminal process, for Mr. Justice Brennan they 
are expressions of the constitutionally fixed relationship between 
the individual and the state. Thus, in speaking of the fourth 
amendment he has said: "Like most of the Bill of Rights it was 
not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection 
for everyone . . . . It is the individual's interest in privacy 
which the Amendment protects . . . ." For him the fourth and 
4Lopez V. United States, 373 US.  427, 456 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Brennan) . 
P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPRIWE COURT 24 (1949). 
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ; NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (dissenting opinion) ; see Ohio 
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (dissenting from the judgment of an 
equally divided Court). 
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fifth amendments are intertwined and together grant to the indi- 
vidual a broad right to be let alone in his person, home, and 
effects. He is fond of quoting the passage from Boyd v. United 
States in which Mr. Justice Bradley first noted that "the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." 
This view permeates his opinion for the Court in Malloy v. 
H ~ g a n . ~  I n  that case the Court reconsidered its prior holdings 
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was 
not one of the "principles of a free government," lo and therefore 
was not applicable in its full scope to the states through the four- 
teenth amendment. Prior cases had considered that question in 
the narrow context of the enforcement of criminal justice,ll and 
it  may well be that our broadly conceived federal privilege against 
self-incrimination is not an essential element of a civilized crim- 
inal process. In Mr. Justice Brennan's view, however, it is less the 
privilege than the notion that "[glovernments, state and federal, 
are . . . constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence 
independently and freely secured7' l2 that is one of the "principles 
of a free government." And in our constitutional system the priv- 
ilege against self-incrimination is an essential protection for the 
individual's right to be free from governmental interference. 
Mr. Justice Brennan's analysis of the role of the fourth amend- 
ment is similar. His dissenting opinions in two cases decided in 
the 1962 Term are particularly interesting in this regard. While 
both cases arose from criminal prosecutions, his opinions speak to 
broader values. I n  Ker v. California l3 he insisted that police 
officers could not, consistently with the fourth amendment, use a 
passkey to enter the apartment of a suspected dope peddler, even 
though they had reasonable cause to believe there was marijuana 
within, without first announcing their presence and demanding 
entry. Mr. Justice Brennan voiced his repugnance to the prospect 
of the police breaking into anyone's home and a belief that the 
restriction on police conduct would not be unduly burdensome. 
The Ker dissent raised the spectre of "police state" activity 
and arbitrary invasion of the privacy of the householder. In the 
face of such conduct the guilty have as strong a claim to protec- 
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
378 U.S. I (1964). 
'Old. at g, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1S86). 
See Mr. Justice Moody's opinion for the Court in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U.S. 78 (1908). 
l2 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (1964). 
l3 374 U.S. 23, 46 (1963) (dissenting opinion). 
Heinonline - -  80 Harv. L. Rev. 9  1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7  
10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1 
tion as the innocent. In Lopez v. United States l4 Mr. Justice 
Brennan found a similar spectre when the claims of criminal law 
enforcement were far stronger. Lopez's attempt to bribe a rev- 
enue agent to overlook his failure to pay the federal cabaret tax 
was recorded by a device secreted on the agent's person, and the 
recording so obtained was introduced in evidence at Lopez's trial 
for attempted bribery. These facts make a strong case for admis- 
sion of the recording. No significant interest of Lopez's was in- 
volved. The statements recorded were made to an agent of the 
Government; thus, the case does not involve electronic eavesdrop- 
ping on conversations of third parties. There was a clear risk that 
the agent would report the conversation. Lopez's interest in 
being able to contradict the agent's oral testimony at  a subsequent 
trial would seem to have only a slight claim to protection. 
Yet Mr. Justice Brennan used the case as a platform for a dis- 
senting opinion repudiating On Lee v. United States,15 in which a 
federal agent was permitted to testify about a conversation he 
overheard between the defendant and a police informer who 
carried a hidden transmitter. Not surprisingly, the part of 
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion dealing with the facts of Lopez is 
noticeably strained in its attempt to emphasize the similarity to 
O n  Lee.16 But the part dealing with the danger to individual 
liberty created by electronic surveillance and with the applicabil- 
ity of the fourth amendment is a compelling statement of the 
necessity of constitutional evolution to meet technological change. 
Reviewing the history of the fourth and fifth amendments and 
the Boyd case, he reaffirmed that together the "informing prin- 
ciple of both Amendments is nothing less than a comprehensive 
right of personal liberty in the face of governmental intrusion." l7 
Then he argued that O n  Lee and its predecessors l8 had carved 
out anomalous exceptions to the rule that wiretapping and elec- 
tronic eavesdropping fall within the prohibitions of the fourth 
amendment.19 The opinion reviewed the "terrifying facts" of the 
-- - -- 
l 4  373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
l5 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
l6 See 373 U.S. at 447-50. 
l7 Id. at 455. 
''See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (electronic eavesdrop- 
ping) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 US.  438 (1928) (wiretapping). 
l9 In Olmstead the Court held that the fourth amendment had not been vio- 
lated because there had been no physical invasion of the defendant's home. 277 U.S. 
at 464-65. In Goldman a preliminary trespass by the agents who later installed a 
"detectaphone" in the office adjoining defendant's was held to have borne no ma- 
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advances in electronic surveillance technology which give rise to 
the possibility of abuse. He pointed out that while the existence 
of an informer or an eavesdropper is "the kind of risk we neces- 
sarily assume whenever we speak. . . . [As] soon as electronic 
surveillance comes into play the risk changes crucially. There is 
no security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigat- 
ing the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy." 20 
Finally, Mr. Justice Brennan7s portrait of privacy, begun with the 
fourth and fifth amendments, is rounded out with the first. He 
stated that electronic eavesdropping may infringe upon the first 
amendment rights to free speech and "under certain circumstances, 
to anonymity" 21 as well as the right to physical privacy. Thus he 
feared that the inevitable effect of eavesdropping by the govern- 
ment would be to inhibit people from expressing their true feel- 
ings, even in "private." 
The weakness of the Lopez dissent derives from the fact that 
the precise question raised by the facts seems confined to the 
criminal process. A majority opinion permitting the police to 
record conversations with a person known by the speaker to be a 
government agent - especially when the speaker attempts to 
enlist the agent in the commission of a crime - could readily have 
been written so as to carry no implied permission to eavesdrop on 
the conversations of third parties. Homever, Mr. Justice Harlan's 
opinion for the Court rests on the technical ground that there was 
no unlawful invasion of Lopez's premises by the agent, a condition 
upon the application of the fourth amendment with which Mr. 
Justice Brennan may well have felt bound to take issue. On 
balance, one would feel more comfortable with the dissenting 
opinion if it had expressed the view that the fourth amendment 
reaches such recordings, but that under the circumstances of this 
case the "search" was not unreasonable. 
This was the analysis adopted by Mr. Justice Brennan, writing 
for the Court, in Schmerber v. Calif0rnia,2~ a case which a t  first 
glance seems inconsistent with the thrust of ideas in his prior 
opinions on the fifth amendment. In  fact, however, the opinion 
is a good exposition of his view of the interrelationship between 
the fourth and fifth amendments. After sustaining injuries in an 
terial relation to the subsequent eavesdropping and therefore not to have introduced 
a fourth amendment violation. 316 U.S. at 134-35. 
*O 373 U.S. at 465-66. 
21 Id. at 470. 
'" 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
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automobile accident, Schmerber was taken to a hospital for treat- 
ment. He appeared to be drunk and was arrested at the hospital. 
Over his protest on the advice of counsel, a blood sample was 
taken at the hospital to determine the alcohol content of his 
blood, and the results of the test were introduced a t  his trial for 
drunken driving. I n  rejecting the argument that Schmerber's 
privilege against self-incrimination had been infringed, Mr. Jus- 
tice Brennan began with the proposition: "If the scope of the 
privilege coincided with the complex of values it helps to protect, 
we might be obliged to conclude that the privilege was violated." 23 
But in the context of the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
alcohol blood test is virtually indistinguishable from other well 
accepted methods of police investigation such as fingerprints, 
police line-ups, and voice and handwriting identification. While 
the blood test was one way of proving "a charge against an ac- 
cused out of his own mouth," 24 to extend the protection of the 
fifth amendment to this situation would deny to the police many 
of the traditional methods of investigation. Thus, the opinion con- 
cludes that the privilege in general reaches only "testimonial 
compulsion" or "enforced communication." 2 V t  then proceeds, 
however, to rule that the withdrawal of blood is a search and 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. But in 
contrast to Lopez the search in this case was held to be reason- 
able although made without a warrant. In  reaching this conclu- 
sion, Mr. Justice Brennan was much influenced by the facts 
that the blood sample was taken by a doctor and that since 
alcohol absorbed in the blood quickly dissipates, the test had to 
be administered immediatel~.~~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan's emphasis upon the passive liberties may 
explain such an apparent anomaly as Ginzburg v. United States.27 
Ginzburg was the publisher of two magazines, Eros and Liaison, 
and a book entitled The Housewife's Handbook on Selective 
Promiscuity. Each publication was advertised frankly to appeal 
to sexual curiosity. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan 
assumed that these publications and the advertisements, each 
standing alone, would not be obscene. He concluded, however, 
23 Id. at 762. 
24 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (1964). 
25 384 US. at 765. 
26Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (possibility of fast escape 
one reason for permitting search of moving vehicle without warrant). 
27 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
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that "the question of obscenity may include consideration of the 
setting in which the publications were presented," 2s that "the 
'leer of the sensualist7 also permeates the advertising for the three 
publications," 2%nd that "[m]here the purveyor's sole emphasis 
is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications, that 
fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity." 30 Final- 
ly, he found comfort in the fact that the proceeding did not 
"necessarily" imply suppression of the materials involved.31 
Ginzburg seems inconsistent with the series of Mr. Justice Bren- 
nan's opinions in the obscenity area, beginning with Roth v. 
United and ending with A Book Named "John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney decided 
the same day as Ginzburg and according broad protection to ma- 
terial challenged as obscene. 
The opinion in Ginzburg seems to focus only upon the personal 
liberty of Ginzburg to publish what he pleases. Granting that 
assumption, Mr. Justice Brennan's reasoning is impeccable: in 
Roth the Court held that a government may punish distribution 
of "obscene" literature; if it were Ginzburg's intention to sell 
literature which the public mould accept as obscene, the case 
presents much the same issues as an attempt to commit a crime, 
and may be resolved in the same way. But the first amendment 
embodies two quite different and often competing interests: the 
right of an individual to speak his mind and the right of the public 
to hear or read as it chooses. If we are concerned with the public's 
right to read, then the judgments whether material appeals to 
"prurient interest" and whether the book is "utterly without 
redeeming social value" ought to be made without regard to 
whether the publisher attempted to exceed the permissible bounds 
of his personal liberty to print. 
As in his dissent in Lopez, Mr. Justice Brennan has emphasized 
the passive liberties in connection with the first amendment.34 
This pattern is seen clearly in the series of cases dealing with the 
power of state and federal investigating committees to inquire 
28 Id. at 465. 
*'Id. at 468. 
30 Id. at 470. 
31 Id. at 47 5. 
32 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
33 383 u 8 .  413 (1966). 
34 Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 US. 476 (1957). 
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into the activities of alleged Communists. In  his first term on the 
Court, he joined opinions holding that questions asked of witnesses 
must be both pertinent to the investigation 3%nd clearly within 
the scope of the legislature's authorizing resol~t ion .~~ But these 
decisions merely fixed basic conditions of the power to investigate, 
postponing the difficult balancing of the competing interests of 
personal liberty and the power of the state to investigate. 
When these cases arose, in his early years on the Court, Mr. 
Justice Brennan did not brush aside as unreal the dangers of 
international Comm~nism.~~ At the same time, he was acutely 
sensitive to the infringement on liberty of thought and expression 
created by calling men to answer for their past political associa- 
tions and to the drastic consequences of "exposure" as a Com- 
munist in those days of public hysteria. Thus, in balancing the 
competing interests of state and citizen, Mr. Justice Brennan 
early came to the conclusion that "exp~sure'~ was not a "valid 
legislative interest of the State." This was so, not because un- 
lawful advocacy could not be punished, but because it could not 
be punished in the procedural framework of a legislative investiga- 
tion. Without the full panoply of procedural safeguards incident 
to criminal justice, the range of the inquiry, and hence the in- 
fringement on liberty of thought and expression, would inevitably 
be broader than in a criminal trial where inquiry must be confined 
to prohibited activity. This is not to suggest that a legislature is 
precluded, in Mr. Justice Brennan's view, from investigating for 
the purpose of determining the need for legislation. But whether 
the investigation is confined to that purpose is for him a question 
for independent determination by the judiciary.39 
35 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 3 54 U.S. 234 (1957). 
36 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
"We are at  a crucial hour and Americans of aU faiths have a common stake 
in the outcome and are commendably alert, although for decades our cries of 
danger fell upon deaf ears. But, certainly we need not panic . . . . Americans of 
all races and creeds have closed ranks against the godless foe. Whatever of treasure, 
of time, of effort required to defeat him, we will provide, and gladly. But we can- 
not and must not doubt our strength to conserve, without the sacrifice of any, all 
of the guarantees of justice and fair play and simple human dignity which have 
made our land what it is." Unpublished Address of Mr. Justice Brennan Delivered 
Before the Charitable Irish Society, March 17, 1954. 
38 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 106 (1959) (dissenting opinion). 
3Q "True it is . . . that any line other than a universal subordination of free 
expression and association to the asserted interests of the State in investigation and 
exposure will be difficult of definition; but this Court has rightly turned its back 
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Moreover, to the extent that "exposure7' for its own sake be- 
comes a form of punishment,4O the legislative investigation has a 
flavor of the bill of attainder. This danger was made explicit in 
Lerner v .  Cesey,4l a case involving the dismissal under the New 
York Security Risk Law of a New York City subway conductor 
who pleaded the fifth amendment in an investigation of Com- 
munists in state bureaus or agencies. A majority of the Court 
was satisfied with the state court's explanation that "because of 
doubtful trust and reliability7' 42 Lerner7s continued employment 
would endanger national and state security. In dissent, Mr. 
Justice Brennan pointed out that the state's determination of 
Lerner's unreliability was not based on a finding that Lerner 
was not closing the subway doors effectively, but upon a determi- 
nation that he was disloyal. Furthermore, as applied to a subway 
conductor, such a determination carries with it an indelible 
stigma of suspected sabotage. He noted that "[tlhe people of 
New York . . . have voiced through their . . . [legislature] 
their determination that the stain of disloyalty shall not be im- 
pressed upon a state employee without fair procedures in which 
the State carries the burden of proving specific charges by a fair 
preponderance of evidence." 43 And by invoking the Security 
Risk Law, he thought New York was publicly announcing that 
i t  had requisite evidence of disloyalty, while at  the same time 
avoiding all of the procedural protections which should precede 
such a finding. 
In his views about the controlling importance of the broader 
values of personal liberty underlying the specific provisions of 
the Bill of Rights, Mr. Justice Brennan is not unlike Mr. Justice 
Black. yet his philosophical approach to the protection of these 
values is not the absolutism of Mr. Justice Black. Rather, he is 
a balancer of interests and, more than any other member of the 
liberal wing of the present Court, he has worked to create a co- 
herent yet flexible analytical framework within which to isolate 
the values to be protected. 
on the alternative of universal subordination of protected interests, and we must 
define rights in this area the best me can." Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Up- 
haus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 85 (1959). 
40 Cf. BarenbIatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 166 (1959) (dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice Brennan). 
41 357 U.S. 468 (1958). 
42 Id. at 472. 
43 Id. at 479. 
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B. " [TIHE PROCEDURES BY WHICH THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE 
DETERMINED ASSUME AN IMPORTANCE FULLY AS GREAT AS THE 
VALIDITY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAW TO BE APPLIED" 44 
Mr. Justice Brennan's analysis of the relation between the pro- 
dedural context of legislative investigations and the substantive 
rights involved suggests the second theme pervading his opinions: 
the essential role of the judiciary and judicial procedures in pro- 
tecting individual rights. 
I t  is fair, I think, to say that in Mr. Justice Brennan's view of 
the constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court does not decide 
constitutional issues solely because the process of litigation hap- 
pens to throw them up for review. Although of course recognizing 
t,hat.de power of the Court to decide is limited to litigated cases, 
he believes that these most basic issues are litigated precisely 
because, in the evolution of our constitutional system, the Court 
has come to be Sewed as the appropriate institution for their 
resolution. Thus, he is not hesitant to interpose the Court's 
judgment in Lases raising questions of individual liberties and the 
allocation of power among. governmental institutions: "I don't 
think there can be any challenge to the proposition that the 
ultimate protection of individual freedom is .found in court en- 
forcement of [the Bill of Rightsl." 45 
Moreover, it is apparent that Mr. Justice Brennan believes that 
the judiciary, because of its independence and accumulated ex- 
perience with the criminal process, is uniquely fitted for. the task. 
The importance of an "independent magistrate" in protecting the 
governed from the governing is a leitmotif that runs throughout 
his opinions. In Abe2 v. United Colonel Abel was ar- 
rested pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by an officer 
of 'the Iwgra t i on  and ~aturalization Service. The hotel room 
in which he was arrested was searched, and the evidence seized 
was introduced at a subsequent trial for espionage. Mr. Justice 
Brennan dissented from a judgment affirming Abel's conviction. 
Pointing out that the search~was broader than one merely insur- 
ing the safety of the arresting officers and preventing Abel from 
escaping, he thought it appropriate that there be "some inquiry 
into the over-all protection given the individual by the totality of 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958). 
45 Brennan, supra note 3, at 567. 
46 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
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the processes necessary to the arrest and the seizure." 47 Empha- 
sizing that the arrest "was made totally without the interven- 
tion of an independent magistrate," either before or after the 
arrest, he argued that without such a magistrate, "sitting under 
the conditions of publicity that characterize our judicial institu- 
tions," 48 there is created precisely that "concentration of execu- 
tive power over the privacy of the individual that the Fourth 
Amendment was raised [to prevent] ." 49 
The "independent magistrate" theme has also appeared in his 
opinions in cases where administrative activity has infringed on 
first amendment rights. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan 50 called 
into question the constitutionality of the procedures employed by 
the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth, 
which, although a creature of the state legislature, was composed 
of private citizens. If the Commission decided that material dis- 
tributed in the state was "objectionable" for sale to those under 
eighteen years of age, it "recommended" to the distributor that it 
be withdrawn from circulation. The distributor would often be 
reminded of the Commission's duty to suggest prosecutions for 
the sale of obscene matter to the state attorney general. Usually 
a police officer would inquire whether the distributor had followed 
the recommendation. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, 
pointed out that the Commission's operation made the state's 
criminal regulation of obscenity largely unnecessary: "In thus 
obviating the need to employ criminal sanctions, the State has at 
the same time eliminated the safeguards of the criminal process 
. . . creat[ing] hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater 
than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law." 51 The 
result was a system of prior restraints, he thought, which could be 
"tolerated . . . only where it operated under judicial superin- 
tendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination 
of the validity of the restraint." 62 And in Manual Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Day 63 Mr. Justice Brennan argued that a narrow con- 
struction ought to be given to the statute authorizing the Post 
Office Department to withhold obscene matter from the mails, 
since "the suggestion that Congress may constitutionally author- 
47 Id. at 251. 
'13 Ibid. 
Id. at 253. 
'O372 US. 58 (1963). 
Id. at 69-70. 
'2 Id. at 70; accord, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
53 370 U.S. 478, $19 (1962) (concurring opinion). 
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ize any process [for determining whether matter is obscene] other 
than a fully judicial one immediately raises the gravest doubts." 
In a somewhat different context, the strongest affirmation of 
the role of the judiciary, in this case the federal courts, is to be 
found in Fay v .  This case was concerned with the scope 
of the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies as a bar to the 
federal habeas corpus power. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion 
represents an article of faith about the role of the federal judiciary 
in protecting individual rights: 
It  is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a 
central role in national crises, wherein the claims of order and of 
liberty clash most acutely . . . . Although in form the Great 
Writ is simply a mode of procedure . . . . [ilts root principal is 
that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable 
to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment. 
Related to Mr. Justice Brennan's commitment to the importance 
of the judiciary in protecting individual liberty is his special con- 
cern with the impact of procedure on the protection of substantive 
rights. This concern was present in the loyalty oath cases, but it 
is most apparent in criminal cases, where the liberty of the accused 
hangs in the balance. As a justice of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court he dissented in a case in which a copy of the confession 
given to the police had been denied to the defendantFc And in his 
first term as a Supreme Court Justice he wrote the Court's opinion 
in Jencks v.  United States,s7 which established the right of a 
criminal defendant in a federal court to examine reports which 
have been given to the Government by witnesses who later testify 
for the Government about events described in the reportF8 
When rights other than liberty are at stake, Mr. Justice Bren- 
nan has been quick to appraise the effect of the procedural con- 
text upon those rights. In  Smith v .  California 69 the proprietor of 
a bookstore was convicted under a Los Angeles ordinance for 
possessing obscene matter. The California courts interpreted the 
ordinance as permitting conviction solely on the basis of posses- 
s4 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
55Zd. at 401-02. 
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.zd 881 (1953). 
57 353 u s .  657 (1957). 
58 Jencks was apparently grounded on the Supreme Court's supervisory power 
over the federal courts. Congress enacted a sirniiar, but narrower rule in the Jencks 
Act, 18 U.S.C. 3 3500 (Supp. 1966), in an attempt to limit the application of the 
Jencks decision. 
5 8 3 6 ~  U S .  147 (1959). 
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sion and held that the defendant's knowledge of the contents of 
the book was not relevant. Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, ruled that the strict liability thus imposed violated the first 
amendment. Pointing out that the effect of the ordinance was to 
impose upon a bookseller the impossible burden of being familiar 
with the contents of every book in his store in order to avoid a 
violation, he concluded that the resulting pressure to refuse 
books which had not been inspected had the effect of suppressing 
books which are not obscene and that Roth v. United States 60 
gave the states no license to suppress such books. Mr. Justice 
Brennan conceded that strict liability might, in appropriate cases, 
be accompanied by criminal sanctions, but not where it had the 
effect of working a substantial restriction on freedom of the press. 
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas " involved the validity 
of a Kansas statute under which a warrant was issued for the 
seizure of written material which had been described in an infor- 
mation as obscene. The information identified the titles of fifty- 
nine novels. In a forty-five minute ex parte hearing, the issuing 
judge examined seven of the books, all of which carried the follow- 
ing imprint: "This is an original Night Stand book." He concluded 
that the seven books appeared to be obscene, and issued a warrant 
for the seizure of all the books identified in the information which 
bore the same imprint. More than 1,700 copies of the books were 
seized and at  a later hearing were declared obscene. Before the 
Supreme Court, the State of Kansas argued that obscene books, 
like contraband, were not subject to the normal, strict standards 
governing searches and seizures. As in Smith, Mr. Justice Bren- 
nan thought that the prior restraint created by removing the 
books from circulation without an adversary hearing on their 
obscenity outweighed considerations of traditional criminal in- 
vesigation techniques, and he found the procedure inadequate 
to protect activity within the first amendment. 
When conduct which may be protected by the Bill of Rights is 
the subject of a nonjudicial proceeding, Mr. Justice Brennan has 
insisted that similar standards of procedural fairness be ob- 
served. Thus he dissented in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,B2 in 
which the majority found no constitutional defect when the 
identification badge of a civilian cafeteria worker in a defense 
installation was revoked by the Naval Security Officer on the 
- 
60354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
378 US. 205 (1964). 
6z367 US. 886 (1961). 
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ground that she was a security risk, although she was given no 
idea of the nature of the charges against her and no opportunity 
to defend against them. For Mr. Justice Brennan the absence of 
these fundamental elements of procedural fairness was a denial 
of due process of law. Here, as in the legislative investigation 
cases, he felt that the fact that she was characterized as a security 
risk "makes this particularly a case where procedural require- 
ments of fairness are essential." s3 
I n  cases involving nonjudicial proceedings, Mr. Justice Bren- 
nan has given special attention to the effect of the allocation of 
the burden of proof on first amendment rights. This concern 
grows out of an analogy, largely unexpressed in his opinions, be- 
tween the liberty of a defendant at  stake in a criminal trial and 
other rights at  issue in administrative proceedings. Speiser v. 
Randall 64 concerned a special exemption for veterans from the 
California property tax. Veterans were required to file a request 
for the exemption each year, accompanied by the affirmation: "I 
do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United 
States or the State of California by force or violence or other un- 
lawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government 
against the United States in event of hostilities." 65 Under Cali- 
fornia law the affirmation was merely evidence of the facts as- 
serted, the truth of which was a condition of the exemption. The 
burden of establishing those facts before the tax assessor rested 
with the taxpayer, and if the assessor denied the exemption, the 
burden remained with the taxpayer to challenge the denial before 
a reviewing court. Drawing the analogy to criminal proceedings, 
Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that: 66 
There is always in litigation a margin of error . . . which both 
parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an 
interest of transcending value- as a criminal defendant his liber- 
ty- this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of 
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of 
proof in the first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the 
conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
6S Id. at 901. 
64 357 u s .  513 (1958). 
65357 U.S. at 515. The California Supreme Court construed the exemption as 
being denied only to those engaging in activity which could be punished consistently 
with the first amendment, applying the standards set forth in Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
48 Cal. 2d 419, 328, 438-40, 311 P.2d 508, 513, 519-20 (1957). 
66 357 US. at 525-26. 
Heinonline - -  80 Harv. L. Rev. 20 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7  
19661 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN 2 1 
. . . . Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due 
process certainly requires in the circumstances of this case that 
the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appel- 
lants engaged in criminal speech. 
This concern was repeated three years later in a dissenting 
opinion filed in Konigsberg v.  State Bar of Ca l i fo rn i~ .~~  Under 
the bar admission procedure in California, the applicant has the 
burden of showing "that he is possessed of good moral character, 
of removing any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness, 
and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the 
public." 68 One of the statutory criteria for lack of good moral 
character is advocacy of the overthrow of the government of the 
United States or California by force or violence. The California 
Committee of Bar Examiners refused to certify Konigsberg be- 
cause of his repeated refusal to answer questions about his past 
or present membership in the Communist Party. Mr. Justice 
Brennan, quoting Justice Traynor's dissent in the California 
Supreme Courtjcg felt that "[tlhe possibility of inquiry into . . . 
[applicants'] speech, the heavy burden upon them to establish its 
innocence, and the evil repercussions of inquiry despite innocence, 
would constrain them to speak their minds so noncommittally 
that no one could ever mistake their innocuous words for advo- 
cacy." 70 Similarly, in Freedman v. Maryland,7l he wrote an 
opinion for the Court declaring unconstitutional a system of prior 
censorship of motion pictures because, inter alia, if a license to 
exhibit the film were denied by the censors, the exhibitor had the 
burden of proof in attacking the denial before a court. 
This concern with procedural issues plays a uniquely substan- 
tive role in Mr. Justice Brennan's jurisprudence. It goes far be- 
yond the concern for elemental fairness expressed in his dissent- 
ing opinion in Cafeteria Workers v. ilIcElroy. The procedures of 
the criminal process upon which he has drawn so heavily do more 
than simply attempt to create an equal balance between the state 
and the accused. They embody the presumption of innocence. 
Just as the liberty of the defendant is thus "hedged about with 
the procedural safeguards of the criminal process," 72 SO, for Mr. 
07 366 U.S. 36, 80 (1961). 
68 Id. at 38. 
BgKonigsberg v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 777, 344 P.2d 777, 
782 (1959). 
"366 U S .  at 81. 
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
72Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
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Justice Brennan, must be the other attributes of individual free- 
dom. The notion that "First Amendment Freedoms need breath- 
ing space to survive" 73 is an expression of the need for creating 
procedural safeguards to insure that the state shows clearly 
that putatively protected conduct should be punished in a given 
case. It is in this area, the relation between procedural safe- 
guards and the attributes of individual liberty, that Mr. Justice 
Brennan has made a unique contribution to the work of the 
Court. He has turned to matters of procedure, not to avoid 
adjudication, but to insure that the Court is called upon to balance 
competing interests of state and citizen only when the judg- 
ment that conduct should be punished has been made in a set- 
ting which is designed to discriminate between protected and 
unprotected activity. 
I began this review by saying that it was too early in his career 
to attempt a final assessment of Mr. Justice Brennan's contribu- 
tion to the work of the Court. That is certainly true. Yet at 
the end of his first decade of service, it is plain that he has been 
true to his vision of a society in which personal liberty is sacred. 
He has expressed that vision as 74 
. . . the age-old dream for recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family, for in that recognition is indeed the foundation of free- 
dom, justice and peace in the world. The dream, though always 
old, is never old, like the Poor Old Woman in Yeats' play. "Did 
you see an old woman going down the path?" asked Bridget. "I 
did not," replied Patrick, who had come into the house just after 
the old woman left it, "but I saw a young girl and she had the 
walk of a queen." 
73 NAACP V. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
T4 Address by Mr. Justice Brennan, Louis Marshall Award Dinner of the Jewish 
Theological Seminary of America, New York City, November IS, 1964. 
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